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The Politics of the Law-Politics Dichotomy
Stephen M. Feldman*
ABSTRACT

Throughout American history, judges and legal scholars have articulated and maintained a sharp separation between law and politics.
This essay asks the question: Why do so many judges and scholars
devote so much time and energy to bolstering this law-politics dichotomy? Using William Baude and Stephen E. Sachs’s recent article
“The Law of Interpretation as a Springboard,” this essay explores the
history and political valence of the dichotomy. From Baude and
Sach’s perspective, politics is like a disease: if it infects legal interpretation, then it threatens the health of the judicial process. But the history of the law-politics dichotomy reveals that it empowers legal
scholars to articulate and judges to implement their political preferences without acknowledging as much. Politics, it turns out, acts tacitly through legal and judicial processes.
fK == f kqolar`qflk =
President Donald Trump’s nomination of Judge Brett Kavanaugh
to the Supreme Court and the recent Senate confirmation hearings
have thrust the politics of Supreme Court decision-making to the
forefront of the national stage.1 We have been here before. For example, when a Republican-controlled Senate stonewalled Judge Merrick Garland, President Barack Obama’s nominee for the Court, the
Republican concern was that the moderate liberal Garland would
shift the justices’ political alignment and change the Court’s direction.2 Yet, during the Senate hearings on Kavanaugh, previously vet* Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Political Science, University of Wyoming.
1. Adam Liptak, Brett Kavanaugh, a Conservative Stalwart in Political Fights and on
the Bench, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/us/politics/brettkavanaugh-supreme-court-trump.html; Oliver Roeder & Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, How
Conservative Is Brett Kavanaugh?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 17, 2018), https://fivethirtyeight.
com/features/how-conservative-is-brett-kavanaugh/.
2. Wade Goodwyn & Nina Totenberg, The Case for Republicans to Consider Merrick
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ted by the conservative Federalist Society, he proclaimed that politics
will not influence his judicial positions.3 He reiterated this claim in
his renowned post-hearings Wall Street Journal editorial.4 Every Supreme Court nominee must declare that law and politics are separate
and independent (I refer to this separation as the law-politics dichotomy). The nominee must insist that he or she will faithfully follow
the rule of law while disregarding any political preferences or values.5
During John Roberts’s confirmation hearings, he famously explained:
“Judges are like umpires—umpires don’t make the rules; they
apply them.”6
Supreme Court nominations and confirmations thus revolve
around an intermingling of political hardball, on the one hand, and
declarations about the importance of maintaining a law-politics dichotomy, on the other. Justice Neil Gorsuch epitomized this bizarre
juxtaposition when he toured the state of Kentucky with Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, the individual most responsible for
refusing to give Garland a Senate hearing (and thus leaving the Court
seat open for a subsequent appointee, Gorsuch). While some critics
labeled the trip a political “victory lap” for the Republicans, Gorsuch
stated during his speeches that “I don’t think there are red judges,

Garland’s Nomination, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Oct. 27, 2016, 1:29PM), https://www.npr.
org/2016/10/27/499514065/the-case-for-republicans-to-reconsider-merrick-garlands-nominat
ion; Michael D. Ramsey, Why the Senate Doesn’t Have to Act on Merrick Garland’s Nominati
on, ATLANTIC (May 15, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/senate-o
bama-merrick-garland-supreme-court-nominee/482733/.
3. Matt Ford, The Misleading Chaos of the Kavanaugh Hearing, NEW REPUBLIC
(Sept. 4, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/151051/misleading-chaos-kavanaugh-hearing;
Carolyn Shapiro, Brett Kavanaugh Said Judges Should Just Follow the Law. Here’s Why
That’s Misleading, FORTUNE (July 10, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/07/10/brett-kavanaughsupreme-court-political-views-abortion/.
4. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Opinion, I Am an Independent, Impartial Judge, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 4, 2018, 7:30 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/i-am-an-independent-impartial-judge-1
538695822.
5. MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW,
POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE 5 (2011) (explaining that during confirmation
hearings, Justice Kagan insisted that her political views would not influence her judicial decisions); James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy
of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 195, 196–97 (2011) (explaining that during
confirmation hearings, Justice Sotomayor suggested judicial decision-making was mechanical).
6. Robert Schwartz, Like They See ‘Em, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at A37.
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and I don’t think there are blue judges. All judges wear black.”7 Gorsuch apparently was not speaking ironically.
Legal scholars play this game too. A recent and provocative example is William Baude and Stephen E. Sachs’s, The Law of Interpretation, which describes two opposing views of legal interpretation.8 A standard view, according to the authors, emphasizes “the
ordinary communicative content of . . . legal texts.”9 We discover the
determinate meaning of a legal text or document, whether the Constitution or otherwise, by relying on the same linguistic conventions
that we would use for any other text.10 From this standpoint, the legal
document itself might have political or normative ramifications, but
the process of discovering its meaning is apolitical. Contrary to this
standard view, a skeptical view questions the likelihood of legal determinacy.11 Skeptics therefore maintain that a judge or other interpreter necessarily injects normative or political preferences into the
interpretive process.12
Baude and Sachs reject both these views and articulate a third
way based on legal rules of interpretation. They focus on “preexisting
rules—rules of law, and not of language—that determine the legal effect of written instruments.”13 As between the standard and skeptical
views, however, Baude and Sachs’s approach leans far toward the
standard side. For the most part, they seek to show how judges and
other interpreters can discern a determinate meaning in a legal text.

7. Robert Barnes, Gorsuch’s Speeches Raise Questions of Independence, Critics Say,
WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/gorsuchsspeeches-raise-questions-of-independence-critics-say/2017/09/27/5accdb3c-a230-11e7-b14f-f4
1773cd5a14_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8be148dd47e4; see also Garrett Epps, Ame
rica’s Red and Blue Judges, ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politic
s/archive/2017/09/ americas-red-and-blue-judges/540924/.
8. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1079 (2017) (describing Baude and Sachs’s interpretation of multiple types of legal documents,
including statutes and the Constitution. In this Essay, they focus primarily on constitutional
interpretation).
9. Id. at 1086.
10. Id.; see also Mark Greenberg, The Standard Picture and Its Discontents, in 1
OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 39 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011) (describing how Baude and Sachs draw on Mark Greenberg in articulating the standard view).
11. Baude & Sachs, supra note 8, at 1082.
12. Id. at 1092–93 (explaining that Baude and Sachs attribute this skeptical view to Richard Fallon and Cass Sunstein). See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning”
and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235 (2015); Cass
R. Sunstein, There Is Nothing that Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 193 (2015).
13. Baude & Sachs, supra note 8, at 1084.
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For Baude and Sachs, legal interpretation is a specialized field. Thus,
judges (and other legal interpreters) draw on interpretive rules of law
specific to legal texts rather than invoking interpretive guidelines pertinent to texts in general. Interpreting the Constitution is not the
same as interpreting a novel. But the crux of the matter, for Baude
and Sachs, is that legal interpretation (pursuant to legal rules) usually
uncovers a determinate meaning for a legal text. Consequently, Baude and Sachs are especially concerned with distinguishing their legalrules approach from the skeptical view of legal interpretation.
Baude and Sachs’s article manifests an inveterate form of legal
scholarship—emphasizing the separation of law and politics. Politics,
from this perspective, is like a disease: if it infects legal interpretation,
then it threatens the health of the judicial process. According to Baude and Sachs, something other than politics must govern legal interpretation and adjudication;14 and that “something else is law.”15 Judicial decision-making must be grounded on pure law, unadulterated
by politics.
This essay asks the crucial question: Why do so many scholars
(as well as judges) devote so much time and energy to bolstering the
law-politics dichotomy? Regardless of Baude and Sachs’s specific intentions, history reveals that this form of scholarship—policing the
law-politics dichotomy—has significant political ramifications. The
ostensible maintenance of the law-politics dichotomy empowers legal
scholars to articulate and judges to implement their political preferences without acknowledging as much. Politics acts tacitly through
legal and judicial processes.16
Part II underscores the numerous ways in which Baude and
Sachs subscribe to the typical law-politics dichotomy. Part III draws
on history to explain why many legal scholars, including Baude and
Sachs, are driven to maintain the separation between law and politics.
This part emphasizes the politics of the law-politics dichotomy. Part
IV is a brief conclusion.

14. Stephen M. Feldman, Supreme Court Alchemy: Turning Law and Politics into
Mayonnaise, 12 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 57 (2014) [hereinafter Feldman, Supreme Court Alchemy].
15. Id. at 1093.
16. To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that judicial decision-making, even at the Supreme Court, is purely a manifestation of political ideologies (with law merely being a windowdressing). See generally Feldman, Supreme Court Alchemy, supra note 14 (explaining Supreme
Court decision-making as a combination of law and politics).
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When Baude and Sachs summarize the skeptical view of legal interpretation, they repeatedly emphasize that it requires judges to inject their normative or political values into decision-making. Baude
and Sachs explain that, according to the skeptics, legal interpretation
“must be defended on normative grounds.”17 Thus, when legal interpretation is indeterminate, the skeptics maintain that a judge “should
choose the best interpretive outcome as measured against [a variety
of] normative desiderata . . . .”18 Moreover, skeptics argue that judges
“freely choose” legal interpretations, producing novel or “new meanings” for legal texts based on “normative reasons.”19
In criticizing the skeptical view, Baude and Sachs emphasize that
the intrusion of political or normative preferences into adjudication is
especially problematic. “Even in disputed cases, lawyers and judges
needn’t—and usually don’t—make first-best decisions about political
democracy, the rule of law, or even cost-benefit analysis.”20 Legal interpretation should “not simply [be] left to the normative predilections of individual judges or officials.”21 Once politics infects the adjudicative process, Baude and Sachs fear, it becomes difficult to
control. Politics is not merely a disease, it is a particularly virulent
strain of virus, spreading and destroying all in its path. “If the courts
are allowed to produce new meanings for normative reasons . . . then
why can’t they produce other, normatively better meanings using
other, normatively better rules?”22 In other words, once the infection
of politics takes hold, then judges become crazed vampires (or zombies, if you prefer). They are likely to go rogue, resisting all constraint, doing whatever they think is normatively best.23
Consequently, Baude and Sachs brood about the possibility that
“judges are unbound by law.”24 Judges cannot be allowed to engage in

17. Baude & Sachs, supra note 8, at 1092–93 (quoting Sunstein, supra note 12, at 193).
18. Id. at 1092 (quoting Fallon, supra note 12, at 1305).
19. Id. at 1093.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1096.
22. Id. at 1093.
23. See Jack M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1141 (1991)
(discussing the possibility of a rogue judge).
24. Baude & Sachs, supra note 8, at 1147.
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“deliberate acts of lawmaking.”25 If judges themselves can “create and
apply interpretive rules” rather than being tightly constrained by interpretive law,26 then judges might be “inventing rules of decision out
of whole cloth.”27 Only adherence to law can inoculate judges from
the political virus. Law, in most instances, precludes political or normative decision-making by judges. “Law fills gaps that would otherwise be filled by the interpreter’s normative priors.”28 Thus, when
Baude and Sachs observe that, from a “practical” standpoint, textual
“indeterminacy is serious,”29 they do not panic. The problem is “not
fatal;”30 law will protect us. “We think there are good reasons to
think that the law of interpretation can be found and applied much of
the time.”31
When it comes to the Constitution, both Baude and Sachs repeatedly emphasize that constitutional interpretation is a legal issue
to be resolved in accord with law.32 Politics is foreign to this process.
To illustrate correct constitutional decision-making, Baude and Sachs
discuss United States v. Chambers.33 The case arose from an indictment for bootlegging under the National Prohibition Act. Although
the government had indicted the defendant during Prohibition, the
case had not reached final judgment when the Twenty-First Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment. The issue was whether
the Act remained effective despite the end of Prohibition. The Court
resolved the case by applying a common law rule of interpretation:
“At common law, repealing a criminal statute would abate a pending
prosecution.”34 The Court reasoned that politics could not influence

25. Id. at 1138.
26. Id. (quoting Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation:
Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 779 (2013)).
27. Id. (quoting Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101
VA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2015)).
28. Id. at 1097.
29. Id. at 1140.
30. Id.
31. Id. (emphasis added). Baude and Sachs admit that law sometimes needs improvement
or reform. But “that doesn’t mean that judges can and should initiate those reforms according
to their own normative lights.” Id. at 1097.
32. Id. at 1118–20.
33. United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 (1934); see Baude & Sachs, supra note 8, at
1118-20 (discussing Chambers).
34. Baude & Sachs, supra note 8, at 1119 (citing Chambers, 291 U.S. at 223).
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its decision: “The question is not one of public policy which the
courts may be considered free to declare . . . .”35
Baude and Sachs applaud the Court. “Our view is that the Court
in Chambers generally got it right, and for the right reasons.”36 And
while Chambers did not involve reference to the original meaning of
the constitutional text, both Baude and Sachs unsurprisingly categorize themselves as originalists.37 Furthermore, they conceptualize
originalism in accord with their emphasis on laws of interpretation.
In discussing a dispute about different approaches to originalism,
they maintain that a resolution lies not in historical or linguistic practices. Rather, the question is “a legal one.”38 They “want to know
who had the better of the argument, based on the higher-order legal
rules of the era.”39 Thus, when historians emphasize that historical
research uncovers political complexities during the framing and ratification era, Baude and Sachs maintain that such research problems
are, ultimately, beside the point. Despite the historical complexities,
Baude and Sachs explain that “the focus on law may help us see past
them.”40 In other words, “[w]hat matters for determining legal content is the particular type of meaning that the law of interpretation
chooses. And whatever linguistic answer the legal system chooses, it
makes this choice as of the date of adoption . . . .”41 The law, from
this perspective, resolves ambiguity.42

fffK == e fpqlov=^ka=qeb= i ^t Jm lifqf`p= a f`elqljv =
Baude and Sachs are not the first legal scholars to assert that judicial decision-making must be based on law and not politics. Langdel-

35. Chambers, 291 U.S. at 226.
36. Baude & Sachs, supra note 8, at 1120.
37. Id. at 1135–36.
38. Id. at 1142.
39. Id. at 1141.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1134.
42. Baude and Sachs endorse reasonable-person originalism. Id. at 1117–18. According
to this form of new originalism, judges should ask the following question: How would a reasonable person, when the Constitution was adopted, have understood the text? E.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Non-originalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 621 (1999). Baude and Sachs
acknowledge that the reasonable person is a legal construct or fiction. Nevertheless, they write:
“The fiction is useful because it’s a legal fiction, built by our legal rules.” Baude & Sachs, supra
note 8, at 1118.
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lian legal scientists,43 in the late-nineteenth century, maintained that
the legal system was autonomous from society (including politics).44
Judges were to decide cases in strict logical accord with legal principles and rules, even if such an approach might lead to injustice.45 After World War II, legal process scholars argued that courts must decide constitutional cases pursuant to “neutral principles” of law.46
Legislatures were to make political decisions, but courts were not to
do so.47
Now, in the early-twenty-first century, numerous scholars struggle furiously to maintain and police the law-politics dichotomy. For
example, in Inside or Outside the System?, Eric A. Posner and Adrian
Vermeule argued that scholars need to distinguish sharply between
external and internal analyses of the legal system.48 If a scholar begins
an article or book by using an external view—for instance, by discussing the political ideologies of the Supreme Court justices—then the
scholar should not attempt to switch to an internal view—discussing
legal principles and rules. The external and internal are incommensurable, so a scholar who switches between the two is likely to slip into incoherence.49 Law and politics must be kept separate. Constitutional originalists, perhaps more so than any other contemporary
scholars, defend and police the law-politics dichotomy. “New
originalists” argue that judges must interpret the constitutional text
in accord with its original public meaning.50 Constitutional meaning,
from this standpoint, is static, fixed at the time of its ratification.51

43. C.C. LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 91–105 (2d ed. 1880).
44. See C.C. LANGDELL, Preface to the First Edition of CASES ON CONTRACTS viii-ix
(2d ed. 1879) (explaining Langdell’s approach to law).
45. LANGDELL, supra note 43, at 21.
46. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 15–35 (1959); see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 49–59
(1962) (applying Wechsler’s concept of neutral principles).
47. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM
TO POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 83–136 (2000) (discussing the legal modernist quest for objective foundations of law).
48. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1743 (2013).
49. Posner and Vermeule call this mistake the “inside/outside fallacy.” Id. at 1745–46.
50. On the distinction between “old originalism” and “new originalism.” See Thomas B.
Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 Geo. L.J. 713, 720–24 (2011); Stephen M.
Feldman, Constitutional Interpretation and History: New Originalism or Eclecticism?, 28 BYU
J. PUB. L. 283, 285–86 (2014).
51. Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 4 (2011) (articulating the “fixation thesis”); see Minnesota v. Dick-
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Current political interests and values are irrelevant to the fixed and
objective meanings embodied in the constitutional text.52
Obviously, Baude and Sachs are not the only legal scholars to
worry about the boundary between law and politics. This scholarly
persistence raises a crucial question: why do so many scholars devote
so much time and energy to bolstering the law-politics dichotomy?
From a historical standpoint, there are at least two explanations. The
first emphasizes a historical drive to articulate and protect a sphere
of judicial power. The second emphasizes a twentieth-century transformation of democracy and the courts’ subsequent efforts to protect
judicial power.
First, since the nation’s founding, many Americans, particularly
lawyers and judges, have been driven to categorize certain issues as
legal, distinct from the political. During the early national years, the
separation between law and politics was far fuzzier than it is today. In
some states, legislatures performed functions, such as reviewing court
decisions, now considered judicial. For instance, the Supreme Court
case, Calder v. Bull, arose when the Connecticut state legislature
overturned a state probate court decision.53 As Justice Iredell observed, the legislature had been regularly exercising a “superintending power” over the state courts.54 Meanwhile, judges during this era
sometimes overtly voiced their partisan political views from the
bench, especially during grand jury charges.55
Such overlapping legislative and judicial functions created potential conflicts between legislatures and courts. In the late 1790s and
early 1800s, political rancor between the proto-parties of the Federalists and the Jeffersonian Republicans brought these potential conflicts
to the forefront.56 The courts developed the power of judicial review

erson, 508 U.S. 366, 379–80 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (articulating a new originalist approach).
52. “Words have original meanings that are fixed no matter what current majorities may
say to the contrary.” Stephen G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 701 (2009); see Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 855 (arguing that only originalism provides an apolitical interpretive method justifying the judicial invalidation of legislation).
53. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
54. Id. at 398 (Iredell, J., concurring).
55. GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801–1815,
222 (1981).
56. See generally STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM
(1993) (discussing political conflicts of 1790s); JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN
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partly in response. By designating certain political issues as law, the
courts solidified and strengthened judicial power over the designated
legal issues.57 Simultaneously, the courts ostensibly limited that same
judicial power by avoiding explicit partisan pronouncements, which
were deemed appropriate for legislatures.58
Chief Justice John Marshall played a key role in this development
of judicial review, particularly with his opinion in Marbury v. Madison.59 As Jennifer Nedelsky explains: “When an issue is designated as
law, it is insulated not only from the clashes of politics, but from the
attention of public debate.”60 Going forward, the issue will be discussed in the technical terms of legal rules and rights—think of contract and property rights—while the political values and assumptions
underlying the specific right are often obscured.61 The political implications of the distinction between law and politics remain no less
true and important today than they were in 1800.62 For example,
when the Supreme Court holds that corporations have a free-speech
right to spend unlimited amounts of money on political campaigns,
then Congress is precluded from restricting corporate campaigning.
The political issue of campaign-spending restrictions is now a legal
(constitutional) issue supposedly closed to further political debate and
legislative control.
Second, the form of American democratic government transformed dramatically during the early-twentieth century. From the
framing through the 1920s, American government was republican
democratic.63 Republican democracy revolved around two substantive
principles: civic virtue and the common good. During the republican
democratic era, virtuous citizens and officials supposedly pursued the

THE EARLY REPUBLIC

(1993) (discussing political conflicts of 1790s).
57. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 190 (1990).
58. Id.
59. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); see BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 5, at
95 (discussing how the Federalist-Republican political conflict led to Marbury).
60. NEDELSKY, supra note 57, at 198.
61. Id. at 188-99.
62. On the developing concept of judicial review, see SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1990); William Michael Treanor, Judicial
Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2005); and Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of
Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made More Out of Less, 56 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 787 (1999).
63. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 14–290 (2008) [hereinafter FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION].
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common good rather than their own partial or private interests.64
Republican democratic theory thus facilitated the exclusion of
numerous societal groups from the democratic polity: any ostensibly
non-virtuous individuals and groups could be excluded.65 With this
significant limit on political participation, republican democracy
flourished within the confines of the rural and agrarian nineteenthcentury America.66
Around the turn into the twentieth century, industrialization,
urbanization, and immigration weakened the republican democratic
regime until it was supplanted in the 1930s.67 The new regime,
pluralist democracy, emphasized widespread participation.68 According to pluralist democratic theory, the government no longer mandated the pursuit of any particular substantive goal—the common
good. Instead, the government provided a process or procedural
framework that supposedly allowed all individuals and societal groups
to press their diverse interests and values in the democratic arena.69
In our current pluralist democratic regime, fair and open democratic
processes are crucial. For instance, the right to vote cannot be denied
or diluted.70
Under republican democracy, courts typically reviewed government actions to confirm that they promoted the common good rather
than partial or private interests. Pluralist democracy, though, no
longer revolved around the common good, so what then became of
the courts? What useful function could courts play in the new pluralist democratic regime? A judicial role emerged, in part, by invigorating the distinction between law and politics. As pluralist democracy
evolved, a key judicial function emerged: policing the democratic
process.71 Courts were to ensure that all individuals and groups were
able to assert their respective political interests and values and thus
64. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, 59
(1969).
65. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT 318 (1996).
66. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION, supra note 63, at 14–45; SANDEL, supra note 65, at
123–6
67. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION, supra note 63, at 166–97.
68. See LIZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL 254–57, 362–66 (1990) (discussing
the transformation of ethnic urbanites into active participants on the national political stage).
69. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 67–71 (1956); ROBERT A.
DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (50th ed. 1989) [hereinafter DAHL, DEMOCRACY];
WILFRED E. BINKLEY & MALCOLM C. MOOS, A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS 9 (1949).
70. DAHL, DEMOCRACY, supra note 69, at 109–11.
71. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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fully participate in the democratic arena. From this perspective,
courts should articulate and uphold legal rights, such as voting and
free expression, which constitute the procedural framework for the
political battles and compromises that arise among competing interest groups and individuals.72 Consequently, according to pluralist
democratic theory, the judicial function is purely legal. Judges protect
the legal framework for political debate but do not themselves enunciate political values and interests.73 Thus, scholars and judges might
brood about the counter-majoritarian difficulty—that courts overturn
the decisions of elected representatives of the people—and therefore
emphasize the need for judicial restraint, but the courts remain justified in exercising their power.74
The two historical explanations for the law-politics dichotomy
share a common theme. Namely, political forces drive the maintenance of the law-politics dichotomy: the sharp separation of law and
politics has a political payoff. Under both historical explanations,
lawyers and judges trace, justify, and protect a realm of power—legaljudicial power—by distinguishing that realm from politics. Supposedly, within the legal-judicial realm, only lawyers and judges are trained
and equipped with sufficient knowledge to understand and resolve legal issues and disputes. In other words, the lay public might be empowered to debate political issues, vote, and otherwise participate in
democracy, but they are ill-equipped to understand, discuss, and resolve legal issues.75
The paradox, of course, is that courts justify and increase their
political power by denying their political power. Judges are empowered to decide cases in accord with their political views partly because

72. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); DAHL,
DEMOCRACY, supra note 69, at 169–75.
73. ELY, supra note 71, at 105–34; see generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
(1993) (articulating the philosophy of political liberalism); SANDEL, supra note 65, at 28 (emphasizing demands for government neutrality).
74. See BICKEL, supra note 46, at 16 (discussing counter-majoritarian difficulty); ELY,
supra note 71, at 73–179 (arguing for Court exercise of judicial review); LEARNED HAND, THE
CONTRIBUTION OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY TO CIVILIZATION (1942), reprinted in THE
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 118 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1959 ed.) (arguing for judicial constraint).
75. Law professors have an additional and overlapping political-professional reason for
distinguishing law and politics. Namely, law professors reinscribe and underscore the position
of law schools within universities by emphasizing that the discipline of law is distinct from political science and other disciplines. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Transformation of an Academic Discipline: Law Professors in the Past and Future (or Toy Story Too), 54 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 471, 473–80 (2004) (discussing the development of law as an academic discipline).
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they maintain that they are rigidly following the law. Given this,
judges and legal scholars have strong incentives to present their positions as being apolitical or neutral. Thus, in constitutional jurisprudence, originalists have gained the political upper-hand by insisting
that originalism is the only apolitical method of constitutional interpretation.76 Justice Antonin Scalia, one of the most conservative justices since World War II, persistently decided cases in accord with
his political views.77 Yet, Scalia persuaded numerous scholars, judges,
and much of the general public to believe that his subscription to
originalism rendered his judicial decisions apolitical (though his judicial opinions often disregarded originalist sources).78

fsK == ` lk`irpflk =
The message from Baude and Sachs is that law and politics must
be separate. They fear, though, that legal interpretation can open the
door to judicial politics—or at least, the interpretive skeptics argue as
much. Therefore, Baude and Sachs seek to avoid open-ended legal
interpretation and the correlative interpretive politics. To do so, they
invoke the shield of law. Instead of allowing judges (and other interpreters) to become embroiled in the politics of interpretation, Baude
and Sachs want judges to rely on the law of interpretation.
Regardless of their intentions, Baude and Sachs’s article fits in a
long scholarly tradition: namely, they seek to police the law-politics
dichotomy. And as the history of the law-politics dichotomy demonstrates, the maintenance of the dichotomy has significant political
valence. The law-politics dichotomy underscores that lawyers and

76. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006) (arguing that originalism is a conservative
political practice); Steven M. Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy: Reagan’s Lawyers and the
Dynamics of Political Investment, 23 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 61, 75–78 (2009) (arguing that
Edwin Meese’s Department of Justice purposefully sought to advocate for originalism as a
means of advancing a political agenda).
77. On the politics of Supreme Court justices, see LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR
OF FEDERAL JUDGES 106–16 (2013) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, BEHAVIOR]; Lee Epstein et al.,
How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431 (2013).
78. Stephen M. Feldman, Justice Scalia and the Originalist Fallacy, in THE
CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTION OF ANTONIN SCALIA 189 (David A. Schultz & Howard Schweber eds., Lexington Books, forthcoming 2018); Jamal Greene, The Age of Scalia, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 144, 155–57, 183–84 (2016); Benjamin Morris, How Scalia Became the Most Influential
Conservative Jurist Since the New Deal, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 14, 2016, 3:09 PM), https://
fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-scalia-became-the-most-influential-conservative-jurist-sincethe-new-deal/.
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judges are professionals educated in an arcane and technical realm
that is beyond the understanding of laypersons. Consequently, the
public must rely on the legal profession to resolve legal disputes rather than treating such disputes as being open to political debate and
democratic resolution.
Baude and Sachs conclude their article with the following message: “We don’t claim to have produced all of the answers here, but
we hope that we can lead others to ask the right questions.”79 Ironically, though, Baude and Sachs point scholars to exactly the wrong
questions. Legal scholars should finally stop the hoary practice of
bolstering the ostensible law-politics dichotomy. In fact, an increasing number of political scientists and legal scholars now recognize
that law and politics intertwine in judicial decision making.80 Rejection of the law-politics dichotomy does not mean that judicial decision-making is all politics, even at the Supreme Court.81 Instead, legal
interpretation and judicial decision-making intertwine law and politics. Judicial decision-making, we might say, is animated by a lawpolitics dynamic.82 For the most part, judges sincerely interpret the
law, but legal interpretation is never mechanical; judges’ political values necessarily influence their interpretive conclusions.83 Thus, even
if there are legal rules of interpretation, as Baude and Sachs argue,

79. Baude & Sachs, supra note 8, at 1147.
80. BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 5, at 15–16; EPSTEIN, BEHAVIOR, supra note 77,
at 385 (“[F]ederal judges are not just politicians in robes, though that is part of what they are.”);
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000). For more examples of scholars intertwining law and politics, see the following: CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ET AL.,
ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006);
Frank B. Cross, Law is Politics, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? 92 (Charles Gardner
Geyh ed., 2011); Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme
Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437 (2001); Howard Gillman, The Court as an

Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive Institutionalism and the Analysis of Supreme
Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST
APPROACHES 65 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); Mark Graber, Legal,
Strategic or Legal Strategy: Deciding to Decide During the Civil War and Reconstruction, in
THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 33, 35 (Ronald Kahn &
Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006).
81. Cf., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (arguing that justices vote according to their political ideologies).
82. Feldman, Supreme Court Alchemy, supra note 14, at 84.
83. Id. at 78–83 (explaining the combination of law and politics); Howard Gillman,

What’s Law Got to Do With it? Judicial Behavioralists Test the ‘Legal Model’ of Judicial Decision Making, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 485-89 (2001) (arguing that law and politics combine in Supreme Court decision-making).
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those rules still must be interpreted. Laws of interpretation do not
avoid or escape interpretive politics. If anything, we should be directing scholars to devote more resources to exploring the law-politics
dynamic at the heart of adjudication. Maybe then we could stop pretending that politically vetted Supreme Court nominees, like Brett
Kavanaugh, disregard their political values once they reach
the Court.
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